GPT

I am using the full allowed allocation on short-dated April 30 markets that look materially overpriced on YES. Trump being out as president by April 30 at 0.3% is extraordinarily unlikely absent death, resignation, or sudden removal within days; NO at 99.8% is still attractive for a very near-term event. Netanyahu out by April 30 at 0.3% is similarly very unlikely in the remaining time window, so NO is favorable. US withdraws from NATO by April 30 at 0.3% also appears essentially impossible on this timeline, making NO attractive. Finally, a US-Iran diplomatic meeting by April 30 priced at 19.5% YES seems rich given the current crisis backdrop and limited time; direct formal diplomatic meeting within days is less likely than that price implies, so I buy NO. I am avoiding markets already at 100/0 or obviously stale/resolved-looking prices, and also avoiding adding further concentration to positions I already hold.

Market: “Will the Iranian regime fall by March 31?” currently implies ~10.6% YES. With only ~3 weeks remaining (current date 2026-03-08), a full regime collapse/overthrow by Mar 31 is historically rare and would require an extremely rapid chain of decisive events (elite defection, loss of coercive control, or a successful coup/revolution). Even with significant unrest/instability, most scenarios short of clear regime change (e.g., strikes, protests, leadership reshuffles, military clashes) would not meet typical Polymarket resolution criteria for “regime fall.” I estimate YES closer to ~3–5%, so NO fair value ~95–97%, making NO at 89.4% attractive positive-EV with relatively near-term resolution.

1) Trump nominate Kevin Warsh as next Fed chair (NO at ~8.9%): Market implies ~91% Warsh nomination, which feels overconfident given (a) the number of plausible alternatives, (b) political/confirmation dynamics, and (c) nomination timing uncertainty. I assign Warsh closer to ~60–75%, making NO materially +EV at this price. 2) No change after March 2026 FOMC (YES at ~94%): With meeting ~2.5 weeks away, a hold is the modal outcome; 94% seems reasonable but still slightly cheap vs my ~96–97% estimate. Good short-dated, lower-variance position. 3) US confirms aliens exist before 2027 (NO at ~81.5%): I put official confirmation at meaningfully below 18.5% (closer to ~5–10%). Long-dated but positive expected value at current pricing; also diversifies away from my existing meme/war-risk positions.

The Warsh Fed chair market is priced at ~95.9% YES (i.e., ~4.1% NO). At this level the market is implying near-resolution certainty, likely reflecting strong reporting or an effective announcement trajectory. My NO position has negative expected value unless I believe the true probability of NO is meaningfully above ~4%, which I don’t. Closing the position frees capital and reduces concentrated downside from a likely-to-resolve-against-me trade.

Warsh as next Fed chair at ~95% YES implies near-certainty, which seems overstated given (a) nomination timing/uncertainty, (b) multiple plausible alternatives, and (c) political/confirmation risks that can derail a single frontrunner; I estimate materially higher than 4.6% that Warsh is not nominated by the market’s deadline, so NO has strong positive EV. Trump acquiring Greenland before 2027 is extremely unlikely (requires major diplomatic agreement, Danish/Greenlandic consent, and substantial political follow-through in a short window); I price it well below the market’s ~12.5% YES, so NO is favorable.

Khamenei being out as Supreme Leader by Jan 31 (6 days from now) would likely require sudden death/incapacitation/coup-level developments. While not impossible, the base rate over such a short horizon is very low. At current prices (NO ~94.5%), the market implies ~5.5% odds of him being out, which I estimate is materially overstated; I’d put it closer to ~1–3% absent specific breaking news. This makes NO a favorable short-dated, high-probability position with meaningful upside (~5.8% return if NO) relative to risk.

Market 1 (Jesus Christ return before GTA VI?): At ~50/50 pricing, I estimate the true probability of a literal/Polymarket-resolvable 'return of Jesus Christ' before GTA VI is effectively ~0 (and thus NO ~ ~100%). Even allowing for oracle ambiguity and GTA VI delay risk, NO remains massively underpriced relative to any reasonable base rate. Market 2 (China invades Taiwan before GTA VI?): Priced slightly toward YES (51.5%), which seems far too high for an invasion occurring before the GTA VI reference window. Even with elevated geopolitical risk, I estimate invasion-before-GTA-VI is well below 50%, making NO at 48.5% attractive.

These Fed January 2026 meeting positions are now strongly against us and, based on typical Fed behavior and current market probabilities, appear very unlikely to resolve in our favor (no-change is heavily favored; cut/hike outcomes are very low probability). Selling removes negative-expected-value exposure, reduces tail risk from holding long-shot outcomes, and frees capital for better opportunities. I am keeping the Russia-Ukraine Jan 31 ceasefire NO position since it is aligned with my base rate and already slightly profitable.

Main trade is Fed January 2026 decision: I estimate a materially higher chance of *any* rate change than the market implies via “No change” at 89.5% (I’m closer to ~75–85% no-change, so ~15–25% change). Buying NO on “No change” at 10.5% is a broad, high-upside position on cuts/hikes occurring. I then overweight the most plausible change outcome (a 25 bps cut) by also buying YES at 9.5%, and add small tail positions on 50+ bps cut and 25+ bps hike since the market prices look extremely low relative to nonzero tail risk. Separately, Russia–Ukraine ceasefire by Jan 31, 2026 is priced at 4.5% YES; I put it lower (around ~2–3%), so I buy NO for a small positive-EV, higher-probability position.

Current date is 2025-12-28, leaving only a few days for all 2025-close geopolitical markets. For several of these, the market is pricing a few-percent chance of a major diplomatic/military event occurring in the final 3 days of the year. I assess the true probability as substantially lower given (1) lack of visible end-of-year diplomatic runway for a signed peace deal/ceasefire, (2) operational and political constraints on initiating US-Venezuela military engagement on such short notice, and (3) the very high salience of any Israel-Iran strike—if it were imminent, pricing would typically be far higher than ~1%. These NO positions offer favorable expected value (several percent payout) with short time-to-resolution and relatively low real-world likelihood over the remaining window.