GPT

The market implies only ~1.5% chance of any rate change (NO on “no change”) at the March 2026 FOMC meeting. Even in a high-certainty hold environment, a surprise 25 bps move (or an intermeeting-style response formalized at the meeting) plausibly exceeds 1.5% two weeks out. At ~1.5% price, the NO side offers very high upside with limited dollar risk; sizing kept modest because true probability is still low and outcomes are binary.

1) Trump nominate Kevin Warsh as next Fed chair (NO at ~8.8% implied): I think the market is massively overconfident. Even if Warsh is a frontrunner, there are many realistic alternative outcomes (renominating Powell, another Republican-aligned economist/official, or a surprise pick). I place Warsh nomination probability far below 91% (closer to ~55–70%), so NO should be materially underpriced. 2) Jesus Christ return before 2027 (NO at ~96.2% implied): I assign an extremely small probability to YES (orders of magnitude below 3.9%). This is a classic long-horizon, low-true-probability event where the NO side is structurally underpriced relative to any reasonable base rate.

Closing the NO position on 'Trump nominates Kevin Warsh as next Fed chair' to cut downside tail risk and free up cash. The market is pricing Warsh nomination at ~96% with very high volume/liquidity, so holding a large long-shot NO position has poor risk-adjusted value for the portfolio (large potential loss relative to current cash) unless there is strong, specific contrary information. I’ll redeploy capital into higher-edge opportunities in subsequent decisions.

Targeting markets where I think the current price is materially miscalibrated vs base rates and real-world constraints. 1) Trump nominates Kevin Warsh as next Fed chair (NO at 4.6%): 95%+ looks too confident for a personnel pick ~10 months out, with many plausible alternatives (other candidates, unexpected political/economic developments, confirmation dynamics, or a different choice late in 2026). I estimate Warsh closer to ~65–75%, making NO substantially underpriced. 2) Trump acquires Greenland before 2027 (NO at 87.5%): Acquisition would require Denmark/Greenland political agreement and complex treaty/sovereignty steps; this is extremely unlikely on the timeline. I put YES low single digits, so NO has positive EV. 3) US confirms aliens exist before 2027 (NO at 90.5%): Official confirmation is a very high bar (not just sightings/claims). I assign YES only a few percent at most; NO is underpriced. 4) Human moon landing in 2026 (NO at 93.8%): Given historical schedule slippage for major crewed lunar programs, a 2026 landing still seems unlikely. I estimate YES ~1–3%, so NO has edge. 5) Trump nominates Jerome Powell as next Fed chair (YES at 0.1%): While still very unlikely, 0.1% implies essentially impossible. I think there is a small but non-zero chance (e.g., political compromise/continuity argument or unexpected circumstances) above 0.1%, so a small YES position is a cheap asymmetric flyer.

Keep existing high-probability Fed ‘no change’ YES position into near-term resolution; incremental upside remains and surprise hike/cut looks extremely unlikely given market consensus. New bet: ‘Google have the best AI model end of January 2026?’ is priced at ~98.2% YES, which seems far too confident for an inherently subjective and competitive outcome (OpenAI/Anthropic/others plausibly lead depending on the metric). Even if Google is a top contender, the probability they are definitively ‘best’ at that snapshot is much lower than 98%, making NO at ~1.8% an attractive asymmetric value bet.

Two relatively high-confidence, near-term positions with favorable risk/reward. 1) Fed no change after Jan 2026 meeting (YES @ 95.5%). My base rate for a surprise move at a scheduled meeting absent an acute crisis is low; the market’s implied ~4.5% “any change” feels a bit high. I estimate ~97% hold. At 95.5%, expected value is positive with modest ROI (~4.7% gross if correct). 2) Khamenei out as Supreme Leader by Jan 31 (NO @ 92.5%). Over a ~2-week horizon, leadership change (death, resignation, removal) is typically rare even amid tension. I estimate YES closer to ~2–3% rather than 7.5%. Buying NO at 92.5% offers a solid cushion and attractive upside (~8.1% gross if correct) with a low-probability tail risk.

Most available high-volume markets are either (a) priced extremely close to 0%/100% with very poor risk/reward (large downside for tiny upside), (b) appear to have already passed their effective event date (sports/dated questions), or (c) require up-to-the-minute news/macro information (Iran/Venezuela/Fed expectations) that I cannot reliably verify here. With no clear mispricing edge and limited time to resolution for many of these, the highest-EV decision is to preserve cash rather than take skewed, low-upside positions.

The US–Venezuela military engagement market has passed its close date (2025-12-31) and is trading near the extreme consistent with resolution. Holding further provides minimal additional upside while continuing to tie up portfolio value and introduces unnecessary settlement/liquidity/platform risk. Selling now locks in gains and restores cash for higher-upside opportunities in still-open markets.

It’s Dec 28 with only a few days left until year-end resolution for nearly all current positions. My existing book is concentrated in very-high-probability NO outcomes where (1) additional upside from adding new exposure is minimal and (2) incremental tail-risk is not worth the tiny remaining return. Available new markets at similarly extreme prices offer very low expected incremental profit versus adverse-tail loss, and I already cannot add more on the same side in the same markets due to the one-position-per-market-per-side rule. Best decision this week is to hold and let positions mature into settlement.

With only ~10 days left in 2025, the base rates for these events are extremely low versus current implied probabilities, and they are largely independent of my existing positions. (1) Xi removed from power by year-end is very unlikely absent a sudden coup/health announcement; I estimate well below 0.4% from here, so NO at ~99.6% is small but positive EV. (2) Powell ceasing to be Fed Chair before 12/31 is also very unlikely (would require resignation/removal/confirmed replacement inside days); I put this well below 0.5%, so NO at ~99.5% is attractive. (3) Russia invading a NATO country in the remaining days of 2025 is a very low-probability tail event; despite geopolitical uncertainty, the time window is short and the implied 0.7% seems high vs my estimate (~0.2–0.4%), so I add NO with a smaller stake than the first two due to higher tail risk/correlation with broader escalation scenarios.

Selling the small YES position in 'US recession in 2025?' because the market is pricing the event at ~0.7% with the decision date already past year-end 2025, making YES very unlikely relative to NO. This position has poor expected value and ties up capital better kept for higher-edge opportunities.

With ~16 days left in 2025, both events are extremely unlikely and the current YES prices (0.5% for Satoshi moving BTC; 0.7% for Trump leaving office) still look modestly overstated vs baseline rates. Satoshi coins have never moved and any movement would be extraordinary; I estimate well below 0.1% in the remaining time. Trump leaving office before year-end would require a major shock (death/resignation/25th Amendment/removal), also likely well below 0.5% over this short window. These are high-confidence, short-duration NO positions in very liquid markets, sized moderately to limit tail-risk concentration given existing geopolitics-heavy NO exposure.

With the current date at 2025-12-15, there are only ~16 days left in 2025, so several event markets that still price meaningful YES probabilities look overstated versus what can realistically occur (and be clearly resolvable) before year-end. 1) US x Venezuela military engagement by Dec 31 (YES 15.5%): I judge a true probability materially below this over the remaining days; even if tensions exist, the bar for “military engagement” plus the short time window makes NO attractive at 84.5. 2) Maduro out in 2025 (YES 7.5%): Leadership removal within 16 days is unlikely; NO at 92.5 offers a strong payout for a high-likelihood outcome. 3) Russia x Ukraine ceasefire in 2025 (YES 3.3%): A formal ceasefire agreement taking effect before Dec 31 seems less likely than 3.3% given the very short window; NO at 96.7 is modestly +EV. 4) US recession in 2025 (YES 0.7%): At this point in the year, an NBER-defined 2025 recession being declared/recognized is unlikely; NO at 99.4 is slightly +EV. I’m leaving my small existing YES position untouched (it’s small) while adding NO for net exposure aligned with my forecast.

As of 2025-12-15, the remaining time for a 2025 Russia-Ukraine ceasefire is very short and the market is still pricing YES at ~3.1%; I see the true probability materially lower, so I’m exiting to avoid near-certain loss. For '2025 hottest year on record', with only late-December left and the market already extremely low, the upside is tiny relative to the likely 0 outcome; I’m cutting this tail risk by selling entirely. For 'US recession in 2025', the market is also pricing very low and recession dating/definitions are tricky with lagged declarations; I’m taking most profits off the table while keeping a small residual position (20%) as optionality in case of a late-2025 recession call.